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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
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OF
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DRUCE,
A Minor.
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)
)
) Case No. '7864
)
)
)
)

_______________________ )

RESPC)\1)ENTS' BRIEF

STA.TEMENT OF FACTS
Hespondents are not satisfied that the Statement of Facts by Appellant is complete enough to
convey to the Court the points. at issue and therefore Respondents add the following:
The A.ppellant, ~1erlyn Druce, mother of the
child in question, went to live with her grand-1Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n1other when she was six years old (Tr. 68-69) and
continued to live 'vith her until she married
Charles Druce, father of the child (Tr. 69). The
child Sally Ann Druce was born April20, 1948 (Tr.
69) and when she was a month old she was taken to
the home of the Appellant's grandmother and put
in her care (Tr. 7'0). The Appellant lived at the
home of the grandmother and worked as a waitress, which occupation she has since continued to
follow (Tr. 14-15). In November of 1948, Appellant started to go out with one Lee James. The
grandmother objected to this because Appellant
was a married woman and because the burden
of taking care of the child had to be borne by the
grandmother (Tr. 7'1). The Appellant's work never
ended later than 10:00 P.M. but she would notreturn to the home of the grandmother and to her
baby earlier than 12:00 M. and fro1n that hour
to 4:00 A.M. When she came home she usually
smelled of intoxicating liquor (Tr. 7'1-7'2). In December the grandmother insisted that she be paid
something for the care of the baby and the Appellant took the child away fron1 the grandmother's home (Tr. 7'2). After the baby had been gone
a week, Appellant returned it to the grandn1other
(Tr. 7'4).
During all the time that the Appellant stayed
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grandnlotlu.·t-'s hon1e the granchnother had
the cart' of the child ..Appellant did not care for
the haby. She was not there long enough to do so
and she slept while she was there err. '72-'73). 'fhe
granchnother was not financially able to take care
of the child "rithout the Appellanfs help (Tr. '73).

at the

The grandn1other went to California in July
of L949 and leh the child with a daughter of the
grandn1other. A.ppellant knew that the grandInother had g·one to California but she did not
take care of the child (Tr. '78). The grandmother
returned in ..August and again took the child. After
the grand1nother~s return from California, the
.\.ppellant worked at Sugar House and during a
period of n1on ths she did not come to see the baby
at all and con\mnnicated with the grandmother
but once (Tr. 79).
A.ppeJlant left Sugar House and went to Denver and stayed for approximately three n1onths
and during this tinu~ she did not coinn1unicatc
with the grandmother or with the chiJd. \Vheu
Appellant returned fron1 l)enver she came to the
grandmother's home with Lee James between 3:00
and 4:00 in the n1orning. Appellant then began
staying with the grandmother (Tr. '79-80) and for
about three nights she caine home at an early hour.
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Then she started to stay away and coming in late,
smelling of beer (Tr. 80). The grandrnt>ther had
difficulty getting her up so as to go to work (Tr.
80-81). In October of 1949, the grandmother asked
for money for care of the baby and she and Appellant had words and Appellant left and she did
not con1e home Sunday, Monday or Tuesday
nights and came home Wednesday morning about
2:00 o'clock, and then took the baby up out of her
bed. Appellant then went into the bathroom, took
off her clothes and went out to her bed on the
porch (Tr. 82). Appellant then let Lee Jan1es into
her bedroom (Tr. 101) and Appellant at this time
had no clothes on (Tr. 100).
Appellant kept company with Lee J an1es for
three years. Appellant's grandmother objected to
this because Lee James smoked and drank beer
Tr. 44) and because grand111other was taking care
of the baby while Appellant was out with Lee
James ( (T r. 71). During this time she was with
him practically every night and drank beer every
night for three years (Tr. 45-46).
Appellant left the home of the grandmother ·
in October, 1950, and during rest of 1nonth, Appellant saw Sally about three tin1es (Tr. 83). On
a Sunday night in October she came to grand-
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Inothei:s h o 111 l~ "'ith Lee J<Unes and pro1nised
g·ran(hnother that she would take care of Sally
the following Tuesday. Appellant did not r-et urn
to take care of Sally and grandn1other took Sally
to the \\'ard House where grand1nother was attending Relief Society. Appellant can1e to Ward
House and gave grandmother $5.00 but did not
see Sally. ,,-ho "-ns playing in the an11,useinent hall
in the \\'ard llouse (Tr. 84) .
.._--\ppellant Jived w·ithin three blocks of grandInother's ho1ne from October, 1950 to January,
1951, and during this ti1ne did not go to see Sal1y
or inquire about her (Tr. 21).
Sally never called Appellant "Man1ma". A. ppellant never stayed home long enough so as to
become acquainted with the child and let her
kno'v who her 11an1ma was (Tr. 33).
Grandmother is 66 years of age (Tr. 48).
Grandmother's health was poor and she was unable financially to ~et vitamins and other things
for the bahy (Tr. 85). The only incon1e she had
was from .rental of a part of her home and monies
she received fr·om hoarding a girl (Tr. 73).
c;ran(hnother told Appellant she thought A.p-
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pellant ought to permit someone to adopt the child
and all of Appellant's relatives told her the same
thing, and they have all tried to get Appellant to
pay n1ore attention to the child and give it better
care and when Appellant would not do it, they
have told her that she had better let someone adopt
it (Tr. 38).
Sally was taken into the Jacobsen's ho1ne the
latter part of December, 1950, and in January,
1951, the attorney for Respondents took Appellant to the ho1ne of the Respondents to see the
home and to see Sally (Tr. 10) and at that ti1ne
Respondents advised Appellant that she was welconie to come and see Sally any time she wanted
to (Tr. 58). FronJ the latter part of January until
October 23, Appellant did not again visit Respondents' home and made no contact either with
Sally or with Respondents during this period. In
January, 1.951~ .Appellant learned that the child,
Sally Ann Druce, was in the hom-e of Respondents
and fro1n that time until on or about February 8,
1952, ~Appellant never demanded the return of
said child {Tr. 25) and never indicated in any
n1anner that she wished to revoke her consent to
the adoption of said child, until the filing of the
purported answer.
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.:\ppellan t has never obtained a divorce fro1n
Charles Druce (Tr. 19, 3?). Appellant entered into
a n1arriage ceremony with one Jack Farrer in Salt
Lake City on October 6, 1951, and on October 23,
195 L she was living· with Jack Farrer at 918 South
\Ye~t Te1nple as husband and wife (Tr. 2'7-28).
Jack Farrer, at the ti1ne of the trial, was earning
$'53.00 per ,n_•ek (Tr. 36). \Vhen Appellant was
asked what she would do \vith the baby if award·
ed its custody~ she said a ~1rs. Baker would tend
her (Tr. 16). The Bakers have a one·bedroonl home
and they have three children and Appellant and
~Irs. Baker have always had arguments (Tr. 26).
Respondent Sheldon A. Jacobsen is a fore1nan
at a garage for an automobile company and earns
$323.00 per 1nonth and owns his own home and
has no children (Tr. 49). VVhen Sally cam!e to the
Respondents· home, Sheldon A. Jacobsen's mother
\vas living with Respondents and they built her
a new ho1ne so that Sally might have the roon1
for1nerly occupied by the grandn1other (Tr. 30).
The other Respondent, Ruby Jacobsen, is a school
teacher and earns $3,950.00 per year (Tr. 52). She
would stop teaching and would he glad to stop
\vhen it is finally detern1ined whether Respondents shall he permitted to keep Sally (Tr. 32].
\rhen Sally caine to live with the Jacobsens, she
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was very thin and was suffering from mastoid
trouble and had a heart murmur and her feet were
turning in. Respondents took the child to a foot
specialist (Tr. 53). Since Respondents have had
the child, she has been under the constant care
of doctors (Tr. 54). Respondent Sheldon A. Jacobsen has built the child a sand pile and a swing and
has provided a dog and a cat for the child and one
room in the home has been set aside for a play
room for the child (Tr. 55).
The testin1ony concerning the alleged coercion
by the attorney for Respondents is as follows. Appellant testified that the first conversation with
this attorney occurred in January, 1951, and her
testimony follo"\\Ts:

"Q. Now, telJ as near as you can the conversation you had with Mr. Young, what he said
and what you said?
A.

Well, he said that these people wanted to
adopt Sally and that they would have to
have my consent, and it was for Sally's
benefit. And I said I didn't know, I had to
see, I didn't think I would give my consent ..And he said, "Would you like to see
the home?'' A.nd I said, "yes." And he
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ag·reed to take n1e down to the Jacobsen
hon1c to see what it "'as all about and for
n1e to find out a little In ore about it.

Q.

~\nything further said at that time?

A.

I said that I \\'ouldn "t sign the adoption
papers, I did state that.

Q. Then did he leave?
.:\.

l-Ie left."'

(Tr. 9-1 0)

The next tin1e Appellant sa\v the attorney was
fron1 two to three weeks later and the following
conversation occurrPd:
·'~\.

He said, "\Vould you like to come down
to Provo and see Sally?" l-Ie wanted -to
know if I would like to come down and see
Sally. I had said I would like to see her
before. And I said, "yes." And so I drive
down to Provo with Mr. Young, and visited the Jacobsen home and saw my daughter.'' (T r. 10)

"Q. Then was anything said about your giving
vour consent then, or did vou consent to
ol

ol
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A.

give it to her'
No, not then.

Q. Did you tell them you wouldn't, or you
would consider it, or what?

A. I would consider it, I would think about
it, I didn't know." (Tr. 10)
When Appellant first visited the Jacobsen
home, counsel for Respondents said to her: "~1er
lyn if you aren't going to let Mrs. Jacobsen adopt
her T think you better tell the J acobsens now."
(Tr. 57}.

"Q. All right, when was the next time you saw
Mr. Young
A.

He came to where I was working again,
that was at Ronnie's Restaurant.

Q. About how long after this?" (Tr. 10)
In February this attorney brought papers to
a place where Appellant was working and she
took them over to the Broadway Coffee Shop to
show them to a friend of hers (who was Lee
James) {Tr. 23) and he advised her not to sign
the papers and she did not. This attorney again
called on her, the time does not appear when this
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occurred, and ag·ain Appellant refused to sign the
papers but the attorney brought Appellant to Provo (Tr. 11). Again the attorney told her it was better for Sally and for her that she sign the adoption
papers (Tr. 12). About three n1onths later, the
attotney again saw Appellant (Tr. 13).

""Q. \Vhat was said then?
..:\.. Oh, I consented to sign the papers then,
and we came down to Provo, and I came
in this very sa1ne room I think, I believe,
I don~t know, and signed the papers.

Q. Do you know what you signed?

.A. It was a consent to have the Jacobsens go
ahead w. ith the adoption." (Tr. 13).
The attorney had not contacted Appellant for
about three n1onths prior to October 22, and had
been in conversation "\\ ith i\ppellant only about
a minute when Appellant agreed that the Respondents should be allowed to adopt the child
(Tr. 21). Appellant agreed on October 22, 1951
that if the attorney would come to Salt Lake and
get her that she "\\ ould come to Provo the next day
and give her. consent to the adoption (Tr. 21-22).
After the adoption papers were signed, Appellant,
7

7

-

11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Sally and Mrs. Jacobsen went for a ride for about
half an hour and Appellant raised no question or
objection to having signed the consent to adoption
(Tr. 22). After leaving ~Irs. Jacobsen, Appellant
went to the home of her relatives and told them
that she had consented to the adoption (Tr. 22-23).
She did not tell them that she had been coerced
into consenting and told them she thought that it
was for the best interests of the child that it be
adopted by the ] acobsens and told them that because it was in the best interests of Sally (Tr. 23).
Testimony relating to coercion by the relatives follo,vs

"Q. Now, did anybody else use any persausions or influence upon you to sign this
consent?
A.

\Vhy of course, they were after me from
Jan nary, 1951 until I signed the consent.

Q. I am speaking of besides Mr. Young and
the

Jacobsens.

A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A.

My family said it was best." (Tr. 28-29).
-12-
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Appellant called her grandn1other and other
relatives and sought their advice as to whether it
"Tas best for her to consent to the adoption (Tt·. 29).
The grandn1other and all relatives told Appellant they thoug·ht it 'vas best that someone
adopt the child. They tried to get Appellant to
pay n1ore attention to the child and give it better
care and ,vhen she didn't do it, her relatives told
Appellant that she had better let so1neone adopt
it (T r. 38).
The Respondents will endeavor to answer Appellant's points in the order in which they appear.

STA.TEJVfENT OF POINTS

I.
APPELL.ANT"S FIRST C 0 NT E NT I 0 N IS
THAT THE PETITlO~ FILED BY RESPONDE.\TS IS INSlJFFlCIENT TO GIVE THE
COUHT jlJRJSDICTlON AND THIS ARGUl\1E~T IS PREMLSED ON THE GROUND
THAT PETITION l)OES NOT ALLEGE TH.AT
THE CONSENT OF 1'HE FA.THER H.AS BEEN
OBTAINED.
-13-
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TI-IE CONSENT OF NATURAL PARENTS IN
AN ADOPTION CASE IS A MATTER OF PROCEDURE UNDER THE STATUTE, AND NOT
OF PLE~L\DING. AN ADOPTION PETITION
IS NOT SUBJECT TO A ~lOTION TO DISMISS BECi\lJSE THERE IS NO ALLEGATION
TI-IAT CONSE~~T OF N.ATURAL PARENTS
HAS BEEN OBTAINED.

II.
APPELLANT, "BY HER PLEADINGS, RAISES
THE QlJESTIO-N AS TO vVI-IETHER SHEW AS
A FIT AND PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE
CARE A.ND ClJSTODY OF THE 1\1JNOR
CHILD AND THE FINDINGS OFF ACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE RESPONSIVE TO THE ISSUE THUS RAISED.

III.
TI-IE RECORD DISCLOSES THAT APPELLANT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY AND
WITHOUT COERCION CONSENTED TO
THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR CHILD.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT APPELLANT COULD NOT ARBITRARILY HE- VOKE HER CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION
WAS CORRECT.
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~-\RGUMENT

I.
APPELLANT'S FIRST C 0 NT EN T I 0 N IS
TI-L-\ T THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDE~TS IS INSUFFICIENT TO GIVE THE
COURT JURISDICTION AND THIS ARGUl\IE~T IS PRE~llSED ON THE GROUND
TH~-\T PETITION DOES NOT ALLEGE THAT
THE CONSENT OF THE FATHER HAS BEEN
OBTAJ~ED.

THE CONSENT OF NATURAL PARENTS IN
A.~ ADOPTION CASE IS A MATTER OF PROCEDURE UNDER THE STATUTE, AND NOT
OF PLEADING. AN ADOPTION PETITION
IS NOT SUBJECT TO A MOTION TO DIS~HSS BECAUSE THERE IS NO ALLEGATION
THAT CONSENT OF NATURAL PARENTS
Hi-\S BEEN OBTAINED.
The attorney for Appellant seems to nlisconceive the issues in this case. Counsel argues in his
hrief now as he did at the inception of this case,
that because we had not at that time obtained the
consent of the father, that our petition was insufficient. 'Ve realized. perhaps even better than
counsel for Appellant. that the adoption proceed-

13-
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ings could not be completed without the consent
of the father. Had we had his consent, the decree
of adoption would have been entered long before
Appellant had a change of mind. Counsel for i\ppellant has never represented Charles Druce,
father of the child, and we subn1it that his contention is untenable.
For a long tin1e we could not locate the father
of the child and when we were able to locate hin1,
we learned that he was in Korea serving in the
United States A..rn1ed Forces. vVe therefore felt
that the Court would not look with favor upon
any petition which sought to have the Court enter
a decree that the father had deserted the child.
Vve believe that the father would, on his retur·n.
give his consent io the adoption and in this belief,
events have proved that we were right. It was
while awaiting his return that Appellant filed
what she characterized '~Answer to Petition for
i~doption of a Minor Child .. , Actually~ this socalled Answer should have been denominated a
petition to revoke Appellant's consent but whatever its proper nomenclature, it was clearly understood that the issues and pleadings raised two
questions. First: Did Appellant have the right to
revoke her consent to the adoption? Second: If
she had that right, was she a fit and proper person
-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to haYe custody of the n1inor child?
Counsel for A.ppellant see1ned to recognize
that these ''rere the issues as shown by his pleadings and also as shown by his sta te1nen t at the
conclusion of the trial, in which counsel for Appellant stated: ··1 take it that the purpose of this
hearing today is asking· the Court to deter1nine
"rhether ?\Ierlyn is a fit and proper person to have
this child? .. and to which ~ounsel for Respondents
replied, ··res, and as to whether she can now withclrtnv her consent already given." (Tr. 110).

II.
APPELLANT, BY HER PLEADINGS, RAISES
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER SHE WAS
A FIT AND PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE
CARE AND CUSTODY OF THE MINOR
CHILD AND THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF THE LAW WERE RESPONSIVE TO THE ISSUE THUS RAISED.
Under Point II. counsel for Appellant argues
that the proceedings "\Vere not had to determine,
whether Appe1lani was a fit and proper person
to have custody of her eh ild. We sub1nit that this
issue was raised by _Appellant in her pleadings
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and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and the Decree are in conformity with the issue
thus raised. Counsel seems to recognize that this
is so because he proceeds to dwell upon that part
of the evidence in an attempt to show that A.ppellant was and is a fit and proper person to have
the care and custody of the minor child.
Counsel cites the case of Stuber vs. Stuber,
244 Pac. 2d 650 for the proposition that n1erely
because the mother of the child lived with a man
whon1 she expected to marry does not in itself
Inake her an unfit and improper person to have
the custody of the child. With that proposition
"ve have no argun1ent, provided that the Inother
is otherwise qualified. The facts in this case are
quite different than in the Stuber case. In this
case, the Appellant associated abnost constantly
for approxin1ately three years with a man other
than the one she entered into a purported n1arriage with and during this period drank intoxicating liquor nearly every night and seldom returned to her hon1e where her child was living
earlier than 2:00 A.l\f. (Tr. 44-45-46, 71-72). Her
whole attitude to"vard the child has been one of
indifference and she has shown a total lack of
filial attachment for the child. Appellant may not.
as urged by her counsel, have had illicit relations
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"·i th Lee J<:unes, but the circumstantial evidence
as pointed out herein would indicate otherwise.

_\ppel1ant cites the case of Cooke vs. Cooke.
et al .. 6:' Utah 3:-1, 2-t-8 Pac. 83 and we adopt what
"·as therein stated and sub1ni t that the evidence
in this ease is posit i Yl' and not speculative as to the
unfitness of the Appellant.
\re recognize that, even though the evidence
sho"\vs . .\ppellant has been indifferent to the welfare vf her child and that she is morally unfit to
have its custody, if she has a right to revoke the
consent these factors would not prevent her from
so doing. But as will be hereinafter pointed out,
ihe welfare of the child is a determining factor as
to "Thether consent Ina y be revoked.

III.
THE RECORD DISCLOSES THAT APPELLA:~T FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY AND
WITHOUT C 0 E R C I 0 N CONSENTED TO
THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR CHILD.
Appellant's first paragraph of his argument
on this point has nothing to do with the question
of coercion, duress, or persuasion but the state-19-
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Inenis therein contained are so erroneous that we
cannot let the In go unchallenged. Contrary to
what counsel for Appellant states, Sally was not
taken from the nursery home by the grand1nother,
and the child was in the grandmother's home approximately one year after its return by Appellant from the nursery to the grandmother's hon1e.
The Court found such to be the case.
We now address ourselves to the question of
coercion. In our Statement of Facts, we have set
out nearly all, if not all, of the evidence concerning the question of coercion. Appellant claims that
the attorney for Respondents and that Appellant ·s
relatives coerced her in to signing the consent to
adoption. Appellant's own testi1nony sho,vs that
this attorney called on her five times during the
course of about nine n1onths (Tr. 30). Appellant
states that she refused to sign any adoption papers
on each of the first four visits but that on ihe fifth
visit she agreed to go to Provo and sign the consent
that the child he adopted. Appellant stated that
three months elapsed between the fourth and fifth
visits and that the attorney had not been in her
presence more than one minute when she agreed
to consent to the adoption (Tr. 21). The evidence
quoted in the Statement of Facts shows that after
the consent had been signed in open Court, Ap-
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pellan t \\'as taken to her relatiYes and that in their
presence she stated that it "vas in the best interests
of Sally that the Jacobsens adopt the child (Tr.

)-)
".

:..

The grandn1other is accused by counsel for
Appellant of exerting coercion upon Appellant to
consent to thP adoption. The grand1nother testified that after the Jacobsens took the baby, she
did not see Inuch of _\.ppellant thereafter (Tr. 91)
and \Ve subn1it that the n1ost that can be said
about the grandtnother·s attitude and that of Appellant"s aunts is that they were concerned about
the welfare of the child and requested Appellant
to either give the child a Inother's love and attention or per1nit its adoption (Tr. 85-96). Other matters quoted by .Appellant in her brief regarding
the n1atter of coercion occurred so1ne time after
October 23, 193 i, when her consent was given.
\Ve are not clear as to why counsel for Appellant cites the cases of Taylor vs. TVaddoups, found
in 24-1 Pac. 2d 15?, but whatever his purpose we
feel the case supports our position. Mr. Chief Justice \Volfe, in his opinion, quotes Section 14-4-9,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, hereinafter set forth
verbn.tim and which in effect provides that the
Court must exan1ine all persons appearing before
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it, separately. In obtaining Appellant's consent we
did exactly what Section 14-4-9 requires and what
the Court said in Taylor vs. Waddoups should
he done. We think it must he assumed that when
Appellant went into Court and gave her consent,
that the Court discharged its duty. The Court saw
her den1eanor on the stand and explained to Appellant what would he the effect of her consent.
There is not the slightest evidence in this record
that on the day that Appellant gave her consent
that she was under any strain or that she was suffering from discouragement or despair. On the
contrary, the record is replete with evidence that
she kne'v what she was doing, that she felt it was
in the best interests of the child, and that her consent was voluntarily and freely given. The case
of Bilderback, et al. vs. Clark, et al., 189 Pac. 97?
is not in point, hut we agree with the sentence
extracted from that opinion, which is found in
Appellant's brief.

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT APPELLANT COULD NOT ARBITRARILY REVOKE
HER CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION WAS
CORRECT.
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Before proceeding with our argu1nent in sup·
port of our position that a parent may not arbitrarily revoke consent to the adoption where the
consent has been freely given, we at the outset
concede that adoption was unknown at common
law· and that the statutes must be strictly followed.
In n1any of the cases to which reference will be
n1ade hereafter, the decisions turn upon the wording of the statutes and we think the decision in
this case is also largely controlled by our statutes.
Later we shall set forth those sections of our statutes having to do wtih adoption proceedings, but
for the present we call attention to the case of
Stanford vs. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 Pac. 423 which
case interprets Sections 14-?-41 and 14-? -42, Utah
Code .~Annotated 1943.
The plaintiff instituted suit in habeas corpus
in the State of Utah to recover a minor child born
out of wedlock. The mother, while living in California, "\Vrote to the California Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children asking the Society to find son1.eone willing to adopt the child.
Later she signed an agreement authorizing the
Society to place the child with so:n.eone for adoption and waiving notice of the hearing on the proceeding for adoption. The defendants were at that
time living in California and the child was placed
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in their ho1ne and later they moved to Salt Lake
City. 1'he plaintiff came to Salt Lake and instituted proceedings to recover the child. The lower
court granted the writ. Our Supreme Court reversed the lower court and in its opinion, stated
that it assumed that the laws of California were
the same as those of Utah unless the contrary was
shown, and the Court interpreted Section '720x27
Con1piled Laws of Utah 190'7, which is now Section 14-'7-41 and Section 14-'7-42 Utah Code Annotated 1943. In this case the mother sought to have
her consent set aside, claiming that she executed
the agreement under irresistible pressure of circunlstances and that her mind at the time she
signed the document was, and for several weeks
prior thereto had been excited and disordered.
The Supreme Court found this issue against her.

"We now co1ne to the question of whether,
under all of the facts and circumstances as
disclosed by the record, the social and intellectual training, as well as the future happiness, of the child. would be better promoted
by restoring it to the custody of Mrs. Hansen
than by leaving it in the care, control and
custody of appellants. As we have pointed
out, the weight of authority, which of course
includes the better reasoned cases, holds that.
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,,·here a parent in writing voluntarily •·elinquishes and surrenders the eustod y of his
infant child to the custody of another: he cannot n·eoyer the custody ot= the child in his own
rig·ht: and. "'here th~ parent in such case
con1es before the coud seeking to recover the
custody of the child the burden is on hin1
to show. not on his own behalf, but on behalf
of the child, that it is not receiving the proper
care. or that its physical, moral and intellectual training· is not what it should be. The
right. therefore. of a parent in such case to
the custody of the child, does not depend
altog·ether on the question of whether he is a
suitable person to have the care and custody
of the chi]d as counsel for respondent seem
to contend. Tested by the foregoing rule~
,,,hich we think is a wholesome one, do the
facts in the case support the decree of the
court? We think not. The court found, and
the finding is supported by the evidence, that
appellants, ever since the child was given
into their custody, have 'kept, n1.aintained,
nursed~ and supported him with the utn10st
care and tenderness and have formed a deep
attachment and affection for him and are
desirous of continuing to supnort and educqte
him *
* and are amply able to maintain,
educate, and support said child~ and are in
all respects fit and suitable persons to adoT1t
him and to have his custody and control.' We
do not wish to be understood as holding. or
7
':
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even intimating, that the Hansens are unsuitable persons to have the care and custody
of the child in question. What we do hold is
that, Mrs. Hansen having voluntarily relinquished and surrendered her right to the care
and custody of the child, the burden is on her
to show that the parties who acquired the
custody of the child by virtue and in pursuance of the relinquishmet have in some way
been derelict in their duty to the child, and
that it would be better for the best interests
of the child to take it out of their custody and
return it to her. This she has wholly failed
to do." (p. 428)
Section 14-7-41, lJtah Code Annotated 1943,
reads as follows:
"No parent or guardian or other person,
who by instrument of writing surrenders, or
has surrendered heretofore, the custody of a
child to any children's aid society or institution, shall thereafter, contrary to the tertns
of such instrument. be entitled to custody or
control or authority over, or any right to interfere with, any such child, and these san1e
conditions shall prevail where the child is or
has been delivered to a children's aid society
or institution by the action of any proper
court."
It will be noted that a parent who surrenders
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the custody of a child to a children's aid society
tnay not thereafter change his m.ind.
Section J 4-4-.J. of the Code is as follows:
··A leg·inutte child cannot be adopted without the consent of its parents, if living, nor
an illegiti1nate child without the consent of its
Inother, if living, except that consent is not
necessary fron1 a father or mother who has
been judicia1ly deprived of the custody of the
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion: provided. that the district court n1ay order the adoption of any child, without notice
to or consent in court of the parent or parents
thereof, whenever it shall appear that the
parent or parents whose consent would other"vise he required have theretofore, in writing,
acknowledged before any officer authorized
to take acknowledgment, released his or her
or their con tr·ol or custody of such child to any
agency licensed to receive children for placeInent or adoption under Chapter 3 of this
Title, and such agency consents, in writing, to
such adoption.''
It thus appears that there are but two ways
in which a parent may give consent to the adoption of a child. (1) In the manner provided by
Section 14-? -41, supra., and (2) By appearing in
court and consenting to the adoption. No express
provision prohibits a change of mind by a parent
-
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where he has appeared in court, yet it would seen1
consent given in court should be as final as consent given to a placement agency. Both agreements
are in writing and the court is surely as able to
judge whether the consent is voluntarily given
as is the e1nployee of the agency. It must be assuined in this case that the Court discharged its
duty and if Appellant was acting under any emotional strain or coercion, we are certain that the
court would not have permitted the Appellant
to consent to the adoption.
We now proceed to discuss the authorities
found in other jurisdictions. We believe that a
Inajority of the authorities dealing with the question of the right of a parent to withdraw consent
to adoption will be found in 138 ALR 1038, in
156 ALR 1011, and in the 1952 ALR Blue Book~
Supplemental Decisions, 11th Issue. In discussing
the cases hereinafter cited, we do so upon the
premise that the Court's finding that no undue
influence or coercion was used in obtaining Appellan f s consent was correct.
It will be note<:} that the author states, in 138
ALR 1038, that in a majority of the jurisdictions
where the matter has arisen the parent n1ay arbitrarily effectively revoked consent. But even in
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those cases it is said that in the reported decisions
the question is left open whether in every situation
the natural parent is entitled to arbitrarily withdra"· consent after the adoption ordet· has been
n1ade, but under this citation are Inan y cases
"·hich hold to the contrary. See: 1Vyness vs. Crowley, ~9.2 i\[ass. 461. 198 N.E. 758 in which the court
said:
·· ... a natural parent who has duly consented
to the adoption of a child by indorsing her
consent upon the petition for adoption cannot
thereafter arbitrarily withdraw her consent
notwithstanding that at the time it is endeavored to revoke such consent the hearing has
not been had on the merits of the petition and
no final decree has been entered thereon."
The trend of the more recent decisions seetns
to be contrary to the cases cited in 138 ALR, supra,
as is shown below. In 156 ALR 1011, the author
states:
"While, as brought out in the earlier annotation, there is authority for the view that a
natural parent's consent to the proposed adoption of a child, duly given in compliance with
a statute requiring such consent as a prerequisite to an adoption, may be effectively withdrawn or revoked by the natural parent before the adoption has been finally approved
-29-
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and decreed bv the court, * * * (citing cases)
* * * and a few .. courts have indicated that the
right to withdraw consent is absolute and not
dependent upon any particular reason, * * *
(citing cases) * * * it must now be said, in view
of the later cases (arising, it will be noted in
jurisdictions other than those represented in
earlier annotation), that the trend of the more
recent authority is toward the position that
where a natural parent has freely and knowingly given the requisite consent to the adoption of his or her child, and the proposed adoptive parents have acted upon such consent
by bringing adoption proceedings, the consent is ordinarily binding upon the natural
parent and cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn
so as to bar the court from decreeing the adoption, particularly where, in reliance upon such
consent, the proposed adoptive parents have
taken the child into their custody and care
for a substantial period of tin1e, and honds
of affection, in the nature of a 'vested right~'
have been forged between them and the
child."
In Re ~Adoption of a ~1inor, 144 Fed. 2d 644·~
and reported in 156 A.LR at page 1001, is a cas~
in which the facts are soine,vhat analogous to the
instant case and the law which pern1its adoption
is somewhat sin1ilar to the Utah law pertaining
to that subject. 'Ve quote from the decision:
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""The single issue of the case in one of law,
whether a natural n1other~ who has freely and
voluntarily g·iyen consent to the adoption of
her illegitin1ate child, can, without cause,
''Tithdr<Tw· that consent and thus prevent the
adoption "'hen, as in the present case, the
adoptive parents have accepted the child,
paid the expenses of prenatal and postnatal
care. n1ade a home for the child and in all
respects satisfied the requirements of the law
governing adoption."
The court, in its decision~ quoted fro1n W yness vs.
Crowley supra.:
'"To accede to the contention that such voluntary consent Inay he withdrawn would be
equivalent to saying that parties may come to
a court, deliberately give their assent to
actions by the court in matters affecting their
interests, and afterwards, at their will and
pleasure, return to the court and undo what
they did because on a future day they did not
like it.·~
The court further says:
"We agree with this statement and think
that Congress, in enacting the District statute~
intended to prevent just such results as those
denounced hy the ~1assachusetts court."
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The District of Columbia statute is as follows:
"If adoptee is under twent-one years of
age, no decree of adoption shall be made unless the court shall find that the following
persons have consented to the adoption:
Adoptee, if fourteen or more years of age; and
the natural parents or adoptive parents by a
previous adoption, if living. The consent of
the father of an adoptee born out of wedlock
shall not be necessary unless he has both
acknowledged the adoptee and contributed
voluntarily to its support."
The court further says:
"In in te.rpreting this language the trial
judge concluded that consent of the natural
n1other acco1n pan ying the petition was not
sufficient; that in order to satisfy the law she
must be actually, presently consenting at the
time of the hearing and, presumably, until the
final order of adoption has been entered.
That, however, is not what the statute savs.
It' speaks, instead, in the perfect tense-'~n
less the court shall find that the follow·ing
persons have consented to the adoption' - in
other words, it speaks of an act completed."
Further, the court says:
"In our opinion, Congress intended that
consent of a parent once given and acted upon
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should not be ".,.ithdrawn without cause."
ln the case of Ex parte Barents reported in
222 Pac. 2d 488 the California court held that
consent for adoption could not be revoked. The
facts, in brief, were as follows:
The action was one in habeas corpus instituted by the n1other of an illegitimate child. The
c-hild \\'as born on May 11, 1949. Four days later
she signed a 'vritten instrument stating that she
was g·iving the infant into the possession of the
respondents for the purpose of adoption and that
she would sign any further document necessary
to effectuate such adoption. On June 17 respondents. having had the infant in their possession
since the Inother gave it to the1n, filed a petition
for adoption. On July 28 the n1other signed a
consent to adoption in the presence of an agent
of the Departn1ent of Social Welfare. On October
20 following, she gave to the Department a docuInent entitled "withdrawal of consenf', stating
that she did thereby withdraw her consent to the
adoption of the child and thereafter she filed the
suit in habeas corpus. No evidence was introduced
and the case was disposed of purely upon issues
of law.

It was the mother's contention that although
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consent to adoption had been given, she had a
right to withdraw it at any time before the final
decree of adoption should have been made by the
Superior Court and therefore, having withdrawn
her consent, that the court was 'vithout juriscl[etion to proceed further in the adoption proceedings. This case was decided on October 2, 1950. In
1949 the California Legislature added a statutory
provision which provided that once consent is
g·iven to adoption it could not he withdrawn except with court approval. This legislation went
into effect after the consent of the petitioner had
.been given but before her attempted withdrawal
of that consent. The court decidedthe case upon
the basis of the law which was in effect. prior to
the enactment of the statute. The court, in its
decision, says:
"But in our opinion petitioner here, having
given her consent under the statute in force
at the time and in the forn1 in which she gave
it, was not free to withdraw the same or to
revoke it n1erely bacause she had changed her
mill~' whether that change originated in
whim and caprice or rationally by reason of
changed conditions, which latter ground she
avers in her petition. When the Legislature,
exercising its wellnigh plenary power over
the subject of adoptions, required the consent
of a parent or parents to the adoption of a
child and when it provided that such consent
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should be given by execution of a for1n prescribed by the Deparhnent and before an
ag·ent thereof; \vhen it provided further that
this consent should be accepted by the DepartInent and filed in the adoption proceedings, it
could on Iy have meant, although not expressly so declaring·. as is later did, that the consent
w·hich the statute required was then to be considered as having been given frrevocably. W c
think that fron1 that n1on1ent on the consent
eontinued without the power of revocation
until the court should have ruled on the adoption. This asstunes, of course, that the consent
\nls. as the forin declared it to be, fully and
freelv given \Vi thout fraud or duress, but we
think that \vhen such real consent had been
so given it was intended that the statutory
requisite of eonsent had thereby been irrevocably supplied.''
.Another interesting California case is Re
Adoption of PilchPr, found in 230 Pac. 2d 449,
decided on April 27, 1951. In this case the child
'vas born on Deccn1ber 20, 1949. A petition for
adoption "\Vas filed on December 22, 1949. On January 30. 1950, a representative of the State Departnlent of Social \Velfare saw the mother relative to obtaining the usual background information and to see about obtaining the written consent
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vised to think the matter over carefully and the
agent returned in March, 1950 and at the ti1ne
appellant signed the written consent. On April
19, 1950, Appellant, through her mother as guardian, petitioned the court for permission to withdraw her consent to the adoption on the claimed
ground that she was embarrassed and confused
at the ti1ne of giving her consent and that she was
assured by the Social Welfare Department that
she could withdraw her consent by merely writing
a letter of withdrawal to the Judge of the court
1n which the adoption proceeding was pending.
The Social vVelfare Department filed its written report reciting the facts generally as related
and found that the minor child was receiving
good care in the home of the proposed adopting
parents and that they had built a nursery roon1
for the child and had taken out a policy of insurance for the child's education. The petition for
her withdrawal of consent was denied. Appellant
appealed from that order and contended that the
order should be reversed because there never was
a valid consent given to the adoption due to the
tender years of appellant, due to undue influence
exercised upon her, a~d due to fraud and her
Inistake.
Section 226a of the California Code provides:
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'"Once given. consent of the natural parents
to the adoption of the child by the person or
persons to 'vhose adoption of the child the consent ''"as given, 1nay not be withdrawn except
"'i th court approval."
The court, in its decision, says:
··_.A.fter hearing the evidence the court was
justified in concluding that appellant knew
or should hav~ known that she could withdraw the consent signed by her only upon
offering a suitable plan for the child and ohtaining court approval of the withdrawal.
The question as to whether the consent was
obtained under mistake, fraud or undue influence, as well as the question of the reasonableness of the application for the order
sought and the questions of the child's best
interest and welfare were all factual questions
for the trial court to determine. A mere reading of the evidence produced shows that no
abuse of discretion appears in the court's ruling.~~

and then the court cites a number of cases, many
of which are found in 1~6 ALR, 1001.
Another interesting case is that of Ex parte
Schultz, 181 Pac. 2d 585, from the Supreme Court
of Nevada. This is an action in habeas corpus
instituted by the mother of a child horn out of
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wedlock against prospe<·tive adopting parents.
The child was born October 21, 1946 and on November '7, 1946 the mother signed a purported
relinquishment for adoption. Formal request for
the return of the child was not tnade by the 1nother
until December 6, 1946 and the proceeding in
habeas corpus was initiated January 29, 194'7.
The court poses three problems. (1) 'Vas the release and relinquishment valid? (2) If valid, is
it revocable? (3) If revocable, is it for the best
interest and welfare of the child to allow it to be
revoked? The statutes of Nevada pertaining to
adoption are very sitnilar to ours. In its decision~
the court says:
"'T'he principal question raised by this proceeding is the right of the mother to revoke
her relinquishtnent. Counsel have fully
briefed this point. The authorities cited indicate that 1nany courts have per1nitted revocation at the discretion of the parent; others
allow revocation if estoppel or welfare of the
child do not intervene.* * * (citing cases) * * *
"Conversely n1any tribunals have denied
the right to revoke, and base such denials on
(1) principles of contract; '(2) estoppel or other
equitable grounds; (3) Public policy favoring
adoption of children, particularly illegitin1ate
chi]dren, or (4) the welfare of the child as
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apparent fron1 the facts."
and an1ong the eases cited is that of Stanford vs.
Crlly, supra. \Ve quote what the court said:
""Ordinarily the law presumes that the best
interest of the child will be subserved by allowing it to ren1ain in the custody of the
parents, no n1a tter how poor and h u1nble they
n1ay be, though wealth and worldly advancenten t Ina y be offered in the ho1ne of another.
\\"here, ho" ever, a parent, by writing or
otherwise, has voluntarily transferred and delivered his minor child into the custody and
under the control of another, as in the case at
bar! and then seeks to recover possession of
the child by writ of habeas corpus, such
parent is invoking the exercise of the equitable
discretion of the court to disrupt private doInestic relations which he has voluntarily
brought about, and the court will not grant
the relief, unless upon a hearing of all the
facts it is of the opinion that the best interests
of the child would be promoted thereby."
7

Another case which holds that the welfare
of the child is paran1ount is that of Walton V.';.
Coffman, 110 lTtah 1, 169 Pac. 2d 9?.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully subntit that the evidence conclusively shows that .A.ppellant's consent to the
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adoption of her child by Respondents was voluntarily given and that Appellant was not and is not
a fit and proper person to have custody and control of the Ininor child and that it would be in
the best interests and for the welfare of the child
that Appellant be not pe~mitted to withdraw her
consent, so that Respondents may complete the
adoption proceedings.
Respectfully Subn1itted
DALLAS H. YOUNG
of the Firm of
YOITNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN
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